Abstract-In 1984, Shamir introduced the concept of an identity-based encryption. In this system, each user needs to visit a private key generation (PKG) and identify him-self before jo ining a commun ication network. Once a user is accepted, the PKG will provide him with a secret key. In this way, if a user wants to communicate with others, he only needs to know the -identity‖ of his co mmun ication partner and the public key of the PKG. There is no public file required in this system. However, Shamir did not succeed in constructing an identity based encryption, but only in constructing an identity-based signature (IBS) scheme. In this paper, we propose an identity based encryption (IBE) based on the factorization problem (IFP) and double discrete logarithm problem (DDLP) and we consider the security against a conspiracy of some entities in the proposed system and show the possibility of establishing a more secure system.
I. Introduction
In an open network environ ment, secret session key needs to be shared between two users before it establishes a secret commun ication. While the number of users in the network is increasing, key distribution will become a serious problem. In 1976, Diffie and Hellman [4] introduced the concept of the public key distribution system (PKDS). In the PKDS, each user needs to select a secret key and compute a corresponding public key and store in the public directory. The co mmon secrete session key, wh ich will be shared between two users can then be determined by either user, based on his own secret key and the partner's public key. Although the PKDS prov ides an elegant way to solve the key distribution problem, the major concern is the public keys used in the cryptographic algorithm.
In 1984, Shamir [1] introduced the concept of an IBE. In this system, each user needs to visit private key generation (PKG) and identify h imself befo re jo ining the network. Once a user's identity is accepted, the KAC will p rovide him with a secret key. In this way, a user needs only to know the -identity‖ of h is commun ication partner and the public key o f the PKG, together with his secret key, to co mmunicate with others. There is no public file required in this system. Ho wever, Shamir d id not succeed in constructing an IBE, but only in constructing an IBS scheme. Since then, much research has been devoted, especially in Japan, to various kinds of IBE schemes. Okamoto et al. [6] proposed an identitybased key distribution system in 1988, and later, Ohta [10] extended their scheme for user identificat ion. These schemes use the RSA public key cryptosystem [12] for operations in modular N, where N is a product of two large p rimes, and the security of these schemes is based on the computational d ifficu lty of factoring this large composite number N. Tsujii and Itoh [2] have also proposed an IBE based on the DLP with single discrete exponent which uses the ElGamal public key cryptosystem.
In 2001, Boneh and Franklin, Cocks [21] used a variant of integer factorization problem to construct his IBE scheme. However, the scheme is inefficient in that a plain-text message is encrypted bit-by-bit and hence the length of the output ciphertext becomes long.
In 2004, Lee & Liao [7] design a transformat ion process that can transfer all of the discrete logarithm based cryptosystems into the ID-based systems rather than reinvent a new system. After 2004 several IBE's [8, 13, 17, 18, 19, 20] have been proposed. But in these schemes, the public key of each entity is not only an identity, but also some rando m nu mber selected either by the entity or by the trusted authority. In 2009, Bellare et al. [10] provides security proof or attacks for a large number of IBI and IBS schemes. Underly ing these is a framework that on the one hand helps explain how these schemes are derived and on the other hand enables modular security analyses, thereby helping to understand, simp lify, and unify previous work. In 2010, Meshram [14] has also proposed cryptosystem based on DGDLP whose security is based on DGDLP with d istinct discrete exponents in the multip licat ive group of finite fields. After some time Meshram presented the modification of IBE based on the DDLP [15, 16] and also proposed an identity based beta cryptosystem, whose security is based on GDLP and IFP [26] after some time Meshram et al. [27] proposed the ID-based cryptographic mechanism for GDLP and IFP based cryptosystem. In this paper, we p resent an IBE on an IFP and DDLP with distinct discrete exponent (the basic idea of the proposed system comes on the public key cryptosystem based on IFP and DDLP) here we describe further considerations such as the security of the system, the identification for senders. etc. our scheme does not require any interactive preliminary co mmun ications in each message transmission and any assumption except the intractability of the IFP and DDLP.(this assumption seems to be quite reasonable)thus the proposed scheme is a concrete examp le of an IBE which satisfies Shamir's original concept [1] in a strict sense.
This paper is organized into eight sections. In Section 2, public key encryption is based on IFP and DDLP. In Section 3, the d iscussion consistency of the algorith m is given. In Section 4, implementation of IBE is given. In Section 5, system initialization Parameters is given. In Section 6, the discussion of IBE is given. In Sect ion 7, the discussion of the security is given. Finally, conclusions are stated in Section 8.
II. The Public Key Encrypti on Based on IFP and DDLP
In this section, we introduce some notation and parameters, which will be used throughout this paper:
Two large prime numbers p and q are safe primes and set
. One may use method in [14] to generate strong random primes. A function
is a phi-Euler function and two integers g 1 and g 2 are primitive's elements in Z N * with order N satisfying
The algorith m consists of three subalgorithm: key generation, encryption and decryption
Key generation:
The key generation algorithm runs as follo ws (entity A should do the following) 1. Pick random an integer , 
Select t wo random integer

Encryption:
A entity B to encrypt a message M to entity A should do the following:
3. Select two random integer i and j such that 
Decryption:
To recover the plaintext M fro m the cipher text C , entity A should do the following:
III. Consistency of the Algorithm
In Encryption: - 
Each entity registers his ID with the center, and the center stores it in a public file.
Step 2.: The center also chooses an unique integer 
is the numbers of bits of N . 
Where I and J are n-dimensional binary vector and stores it as the centers secret information. The condition of (4) (4) . In this paper, we adopt the above scheme. However, another method might be possible.
Step 
Entity A's public information
A ID is a  k dimensional vector {see (1)}
VI. Protocol of IBE scheme
Without loss of generality suppose that entity B wishes to send message M to entity A. 
Encryption
Entity B generates

Eu ler function of N . In th is system Coppersmith showed an attacking method [22] such that ) 1 (  n entities conspiracy can derive the center's secret information.
 which is equivalent (not necessarily identical) to the original center's secret information. Then, a similar method with Attack (1) is applicable; hence, the center's secret informat ion can be derived by ) 1 (  n entities conspiracy.
Furthermore, Shamir developed a more general attacking method [23] for the modified system such that ) 2 (  n entities conspiracy can derive the center's secret information with high probability.
can derive the center's secret information a with high probability.
conspire, they have the following system of linear congruence's defied by (16) )) ( (mod efficiently. An addit ional p rocedure to find the center's secret information is comp letely the same as attack 1.
Attack 3:
Suppose an attacker wishes to recover all secret keys, ie q p, and k , using all informations available fro m the system. Then attacker needs to solve the IFP to find the p rimes p and q , solve the DDLP to find the secrete k . The best known technique to solve the IFP is by using the Number Field Sieve (NFS) [25] . Nevertheless, this method depends on the size of the modulus N . In other words, the complexity of the NFS method increases with the size of N . When 1024  N , the NFS technique is co mputationally infeasible. For a better security we use strong safe primes [12] 
VIII. Conclusion
We discussed IBE based on IFP and DDLP in the mu ltip licat ive group. The proposed scheme satisfies Shamir's original concepts in a strict sense, i.e. it does not require any interactive preliminary co mmun ications in each data trans mission and has no assumption that tamper free modules are availab le. This kind of scheme definitely provides a new scheme with a longer and higher level o f security than that based on a IFP and DDLP in the multip licat ive group. It is also requires minimal operations in encryption and decryption algorith ms and thus makes it is very efficient. The present paper provides the special result from the security point of view, because we faced the problem of solving factoring with double and triple distinct discrete logarith m problem simu ltaneously at the same time in the mu ltiplicative group as compared to the other public key cryptosystem.
